01
摘要
基于政府、企业和消费者三方相互作用的利益关系构建动态博弈演化模型，对三方动态博弈演变路径进行探寻，并通过算例仿真， 进一步验证三方动态博弈演变路径及各影响因素的灵敏度变化方向与强度， 最终提出稳定性策略建议。研究发现，基于政府驱动的三方动态博弈演变可实现帕累托最优策略均衡。政府监管形象和政府处罚对政府监管概率的提升具有正向影响作用，企业规范经营收益、企业处罚、政府奖惩对企业规范经营概率的提升具有正向影响作用，企业奖惩对消费者守约概率的提升具有正向影响作用，而三方策略投入成本对其概率的提升均具有负向影响作用。为了实现帕累托最优策略均衡，政府行政监管过程中通常采取以行政处罚为主、奖励为辅的策略，而共享单车企业通常采取以企业奖励为主、惩罚为辅的策略。
分析:作者对于全文一个缩影的描写是简明扼要的，基于三方相互作用的利益关系，构建了动态博弈演化模型，对演变路径进行探寻，并进一步验证三方动态博弈演变路径和各因素的影响。这一段文字都是对整个文章高度的一个总结，语句连贯且表达清楚。随后，作者指出了其研究结果，各研究因素对演化决策的影响。作者通过得到的研究结论，对政府与企业提出响应的意见。
Analysis: The author's description of a microcosm of the full text is concise and concise. Based on the interests of the tripartite interaction, he constructed a dynamic game evolution model, explored the evolution path, and further verified the evolution path of the tripartite dynamic game and the influence of various factors. This paragraph of text is a summary of the height of the entire article, the sentences are coherent and clearly expressed. Subsequently, the author pointed out his research results and the influence of various research factors on evolutionary decision-making. Through the research conclusions obtained, the author puts forward corresponding opinions to the government and enterprises.
02
关键词
关键词：动态博弈；共享单车；监督；经营规范；守约
分析：第一类关键词："共享单车"，指出研究对象是共享单车的涉及主体的行为研究。第二类关键词："动态博弈"，指出研究方法是使用动态博弈。第三类关键词：结论类的关键词，"监督"、"规范经营"、"守约"小编认为是第三类关键词，因为作者为了使演化方向向政府监督、企业规范经营、消费者守约的方向演进，所以这三个积极选择的行为，应该属于研究结论类的。
Analysis: The first category of keywords: "shared bicycles", pointed out that the research object is the behavioral research involving the subject of shared bicycles. The second category of keywords: "dynamic game", pointed out that the research method is to use dynamic game. The third category of keywords: conclusion category keywords, "supervision", "standardized management", "compliance" editor thinks that they are the third category of keywords, because the author wants to evolve toward government supervision, enterprise standardization, and consumption. The direction of the contract-keeping of the people is evolving, so these three active choices should belong to the category of research conclusions.
03
引言
共享单车作为共享经济的一种新形态，有效弥补了城市公共交通之间衔接不够紧密的问题，迎合了低碳绿色出行的环保理念［1］，成为解决市民“最后一公里”出行的重要交通工具。然而，共享单车的快速发展在提升政府公共服务功能、方便市民出行的同时，也引发了一系列的城市社会问题，如：共享单车乱停乱放，扰乱社会秩序；共享单车过度投放，占用公共资源；消费者恶意损毁、占用车辆，危害共享单车经营者利益等［2］。共享单车所引发的系列社会问题，严重阻碍了共享单车的健康发展，探究问题的根源，既有政府监管不到位，相关法规、制度不健全的原因；也有共享单车企业盲目扩张、不规范经营的责任；还有城市消费者片面追求自身利益、诚信守约意识缺失的问题。因此，从政府监督、共享单车企业规范经营和消费者诚信守约方面对三方博弈的稳定性策略进行分析，对全面消除共享单车发展中的负面社会影响将具有十分重要的意义。
分析：作者针对问题的提出，采用了以下逻辑：共享单车的定义，共享单车的快速发展带来的一系列问题，分别从政府、企业、消费者的角度阐述其带来的矛盾与利益冲突。因此，政府、企业和消费者的博弈以及其策略的选择将影响共享单车的发展带来的负面效应。作者也是较为清楚的阐述了论文的背景，以及该研究的现实意义。
Analysis: The author adopts the following logic to put forward the problem: the definition of shared bicycles, a series of problems brought about by the rapid development of shared bicycles, and the contradictions and conflicts of interest brought about by the government, enterprises, and consumers. Therefore, the game between the government, enterprises and consumers and the choice of their strategies will affect the negative effects of the development of shared bicycles. The author also explained clearly the background of the paper and the practical significance of the research.
在文献综述部分，作者逻辑将整理为以下几个方面：先介绍国外先行对共享经济的提出，然后介绍国内针对共享单车定义的不同声音，接着介绍了共享单车引发的社会问题，再介绍了博弈理论在共享单车中的运用，最后提出政府规制的作用。逻辑是清晰合理的，将要研究的问题阐述的十分清楚。
In the literature review part, the author’s logic will be organized into the following aspects: first introduce the first foreign proposals for the sharing economy, then introduce the different voices in the definition of shared bicycles in China, then introduce the social problems caused by shared bicycles, and then introduce the game. The application of the theory in shared bicycles finally puts forward the role of government regulation. The logic is clear and reasonable, and the problem to be studied is very clear.
最后，作者对上面的文献回顾进行了总结，并指出自己所做研究的创新点。
Finally, the author summarized the above literature review and pointed out the innovative points of his own research.
04
基本假设与符号变量
分析：作者首先对该研究做了基本假设，在这基础上分别分析政府、企业、消费者三方的各选择的成本与收益。
Analysis:The author first made basic assumptions about the study, and then analyzed the costs and benefits of the choices made by the government, enterprises, and consumers.
上图为三方博弈关系图。
The picture above is the three-party game relationship diagram.
上表的三方各个策略组合下，政府、企业、消费者的收益。
The benefits of the government, enterprises, and consumers under each of the three strategies in the table above.
05
三方博弈路径与分析
作者先将三方博弈的8种策略组合分成3种演化情况。由此得到该模型的稳定性策略只能由政府驱动，并随后对政府驱动的演化路径进行分析。
The author first divides the 8 strategy combinations of the tripartite game into 3 evolution situations.Therefore, the stability strategy of the model can only be driven by the government, and then the evolution path driven by the government is analyzed.
作者分为四个阶段，分别分析每个阶段的情形。
The author is divided into four stages and analyzes the situation of each stage separately.
06
结语
分析：不同于一般结论的写法，该篇文章，将结语部分直接分为了两个部分，一部分是研究结果，一部分是政策建议。作者将得到的研究结论凝炼了，我们可以看出来与前文摘要的描写不一样，同时文中也没有这样的描述，而是作者对文章进行了升华。
Analysis: Different from the writing of general conclusions, this article directly divides the conclusion part into two parts, one part is the research result and the other part is the policy suggestion. The author condensed the research conclusions obtained. We can see that it is not the same as the description in the previous abstract. At the same time, there is no such description in the article, but the author sublimated the article.
参考资料：谷歌翻译、知网
参考文献：政府、共享单车企业与消费者三方动态博弈演变及稳定性策略分析
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