将中国排除在外的印太经济框架不会成功
定义宽泛的集团应发挥有意义的作用，努力使亚洲脱碳
本文刊于日本经济新闻
（2022年5月28日）
作者
王辉耀教授为全球化智库创始人、理事长
5月23日，美国总统拜登(Joe Biden)宣布启动酝酿已久的印太经济框架，旨在促进美国在该地区的经济参与。虽然细节尚未公布，但此计划很难奏效。据报道称，该计划为吸引更多的国家在最后一刻降低了要求。
第一个问题是可信度。过去十年间，美国在亚洲的角色随华盛顿政治风向来回变化，一直处于短暂不停的转变的漩涡。
自美国退出奥巴马的《跨太平洋伙伴关系协定》，及随后特朗普自由开放的印太协定之后，亚洲领导人对印太经济框架有所怀疑是可以理解的；尤其拜登自身政治前途暗淡，特朗普连任总统的可能性越来越大。
第二个更大的问题是印太经济框架对发展中经济体没有多大帮助。国内政界认为拜登无法提供那种市场准入激励措施。在最初TPP谈判时，这些措施对于说服越南等国家接受更严格的标准方面至关重要。剩下的是一份美国希望做出的承诺清单，而几乎没有什么切实益处。
大多数亚洲国家欢迎美国更深入地参与该地区的经济，但不想沦为棋盘上的棋子，被迫在美中之间做出选择。对亚洲大多数国家来说，中国是更重要的经济伙伴。
正如新加坡学者马凯硕 (Kishore Mahbubani) 指出那样，东南亚国家对谈论“自由”“开放”不感兴趣，而更多关注该地区的物质需求及其从疫情中恢复的情况。
如果拜登想要确保印太经济框架得到支持，证明它不仅仅是促进美国利益的地缘政治工具，他必须证明，在传统的市场准入渠道之外，它能够带来实际利益。纵观拜登总统在东京列出的项目清单，基础设施与气候变化是核心支柱。
亚太地区是应对气候变化的决胜战场，是世界上人口最多、增长最快的经济体所在地，占全球碳排放量一半以上，且极易受到极端天气事件的影响，如最近南亚的热浪。
然而，该地区也面临着重大的发展挑战，包括每年1.7万亿美元基础设施支出缺口，而且该地区脱碳速度远低于全球平均水平。
如果华盛顿想在亚洲脱碳进程中发挥有意义的作用，它需要做的不仅仅是迫使各国制定更有雄心的气候目标；它还应作出可持续的承诺，支持绿色基础设施投资，这将加速向清洁能源过渡以及从疫情中合理复苏。
这使我们对这样的问题视而不见。如果排除亚洲最大的经济体、亚洲供应链的枢纽，更不必说在平价基础设施与可再生能源解决方案方面处于世界领先地位的中国，印太经济框架能否在扩大气候友好型投资方面发挥真正作用？
在印太经济框架或者一带一路倡议下与中国就绿色基础设施正式合作，在当前政治氛围下可能是一项艰巨的任务。毕竟，拜登的新框架是为与中国的战略竞争而设计。与前任一样，将其视为中美双边关系的中心主题。
然而，与特朗普不同的是，拜登认真对待气候变化，并愿与中国合作解决这一问题。
拜登身为副总统时，在与中国气候合作项目中发挥了关键作用。该项目对2015年巴黎协定的达成起到了重要作用，并见证了美中两国企业在美中气候变化工作组下富有成效的合作。该工作组曾被特朗普抛弃，但在去年11月举行的第26届联合国气候变化大会上（COP26）取得罕见的双边突破后，该组织将重新启动。
如果美中两国能够搁置分歧，共同努力，两国就具有推动亚洲脱碳取得真正进展的影响力与互补能力。中国是风能、太阳能等气候友好型技术的顶级生产国，而美国则在将这些产品集成到电网和城市系统中处于领先地位。
将中国在硬基础设施方面的优势与美国在标准、治理和制度等软基础设施方面的专长相结合，可以产生许多协同效应。
向前迈出的一步将是在重新启动的气候工作组下形成一项新的行动倡议，以促进与亚洲第三国的双边合作。这将使美中两国在促进整个地区绿色基础设施方面实现信息共享、对话以及一定程度的协调效应。
它还可成为促进美中两国企业与东道国合作的工具，在清洁能源、绿色建筑与智慧城市等领域释放绿色机遇。
印太经济框架批评者称，它只是遏制中国的工具，对印太地区几乎没有益处。拜登可以通过调整此框架，为亚洲的脱碳做出持续而有意义的贡献来证明他们是错的。我们所有人的未来均依赖于此项艰巨的任务，只有所有主要角色共同努力才能实现。
拜登知晓大国必须学会共存，并面对无法单独克服的挑战。他已经承诺其中国战略将在竞争与合作之间寻求平衡。
与北京方面寻求合作途径，扩大印太经济框架与一带一路倡议的绿色效益，将是一个很好的起点。
文章选自日本经济新闻，2022年5月28日
Biden's Indo-Pacific framework cannot succeed without China
Joe Biden at the launch event of the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework in Tokyo on May 23: Formal cooperation with China on green infrastructure under IPEF may be a tall order. Reuters
Professor Wang Huiyao is founder and president of the Center for China & Globalization.
On May 23, President Joe Biden unveiled his Indo-Pacific Economic Framework, a long-sought plan to boost U.S. economic engagement in the region. While details are yet to be fleshed out, the plan will be a tough sell, as reflected by reports that it was watered down at the last minute to attract more countries.
The first problem is credibility. Over the last decade, America's role in Asia has been a swirl of short-lived acronyms and aspirations that come and go with the political winds in Washington.
After the U.S. withdrew from Barack Obama's own Trans-Pacific Partnership and the subsequent demise of Donald Trump's free and open Indo-Pacific, Asian leaders will be forgiven for looking askance at the IPEF, especially with Biden's own political fortunes flagging and the looming possibility of a second Trump presidency.
The second, larger problem is that IPEF just does not offer much to developing economies. Domestic politics mean that Biden cannot offer the kind of market access incentives that were crucial in persuading countries like Vietnam to accept stricter standards when the original TPP was negotiated. What is left is an American wish list of commitments and little in the way of tangible benefits.
Most countries in Asia welcome deeper U.S. economic engagement in the region. But they do not want to be reduced to pawns on a chessboard and be forced to choose between the U.S. and China, which for most is a far more important economic partner.
As Singaporean academic Kishore Mahbubani points out, Southeast Asian nations are less interested in talk of "freedom" and "openness" and more about the material needs of the region and its recovery from the pandemic.
If Biden wants to secure buy-in for IPEF and prove it is more than a geopolitical tool to further U.S. interests, he will have to show it can deliver practical benefits outside the traditional market-access channel. Looking down the list of items that President Biden outlined in Tokyo, infrastructure and climate change is the pillar that stands out.
The Asia-Pacific is a make-or-break battlefield in our fight against climate change. It is home to the world's most populous and fastest-growing economies, accounts for over half of global carbon emissions, and is highly exposed to extreme weather events, as shown by the recent heat waves in South Asia.
A dried patch of the river Yamuna in New Delhi on May 2: The Asia-Pacific is a make-or-break battlefield in our fight against climate change. AP
However, the region also faces significant developmental challenges, including an annual infrastructure spending gap of $1.7 trillion, and is decarbonizing much slower than the global average.
Washington needs to do more than arm-twist countries into more ambitious climate targets if it wants to play a meaningful role in decarbonizing Asia. It should also make a sustained commitment to support investment in green infrastructure, which would accelerate both the transition to clean energy and equitable recovery from the pandemic.
This brings us to the elephant in the room. Can IPEF make a real difference in scaling up climate-friendly investments if it excludes Asia's largest economy, the hub of its supply chains, not to mention the world leader in affordable infrastructure and renewable energy solutions?
Formal cooperation with China on green infrastructure under IPEF, or for that matter, the Belt and Road Initiative, may be a tall order in the current political atmosphere. After all, Biden's new framework is crafted for strategic competition with China, which Biden, like his predecessor, sees as the central theme of the bilateral relationship.
However, unlike Trump, Biden takes climate change seriously and is willing to work with China to address it.
As vice president, he played a key role in a program of climate cooperation with China that was instrumental in the 2015 Paris agreement and saw fruitful collaborations between companies from both countries under the U.S.-China Climate Change Working Group. The group was abandoned by Trump but is now set to be revived following a rare bilateral breakthrough at the 26th U.N. Climate Change Conference of the Parties, or COP26, last November.
If they can put aside their differences and work together, the U.S. and China have the clout and complementary capabilities to drive real progress in decarbonizing Asia. China is a top manufacturer of climate-friendly technologies such as wind and solar; the U.S. is a leader in systems that integrate these products into power grids and cities.
There are many synergies to be gained by combining China's strengths in hard infrastructure with America's expertise in soft infrastructure, such as standards, governance and institutions.
One step forward would be to form a new action initiative under the revived climate working group to facilitate bilateral cooperation in third countries in Asia. This would allow information sharing, dialogue and some degree of coordination between the U.S. and China in promoting green infrastructure across the region.
It could also be a vehicle to match and enable collaboration between U.S. and Chinese companies in working with host countries to unlock green opportunities in fields such as clean energy, green buildings and smart cities.
Critics of IPEF say it is merely a tool to contain China that offers little benefit to the region. Biden can prove they are wrong by equipping the framework to make a sustained and meaningful contribution to decarbonizing Asia. This mammoth task, on which all our futures depend, can only be achieved if all the key actors work together.
Biden knows that great powers must learn to coexist and face challenges that cannot be overcome alone. He has promised his China strategy will strike a balance between competition and cooperation.
Finding ways to work with Beijing to amplify the green benefits of the IPEF and the BRI would be a great place to start.
From Nikkei Asia, 2022-5-28
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